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Abstract 
 
 Research suggests that public fear and anger in 
wake of a terror attack can each uniquely contribute 
to policy attitudes and risk-avoidance behaviors. 
Given the importance of these negative-valanced 
emotions, there is value in studying how terror events 
can incite fear and anger at various times and 
locations relative to an attack. We analyze 36,259 
Twitter posts authored in response to the 2016 
Orlando nightclub shooting and examined how fear- 
and anger-related language varied with time and 
distance from the attack. Fear-related words sharply 
decreased over time, though the trend was strongest 
at locations near the attack, while anger-related 
words slightly decreased over time and increased 
with distance from Orlando. Comparing these results 
to users’ pre-attack emotional language suggested 
that distant users remained both angry and fearful 
after the shooting, while users close to the attack 
remained angry but quickly reduced expressions of 
fear to pre-attack levels. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Understanding public reactions to highly salient 
terror attacks is crucial to appraising the overall risk 
that terrorism poses to society. Terror attacks have 
the potential to cause psychological and economic 
damage that can far outlast their immediate effects [1, 
2, 3, 4], and it is important for researchers and public 
officials to anticipate the contours of such effects as 
best as possible. 
Intuitively, any highly publicized act of terror 
should cause heightened levels of negative affect 
among the public. Yet one of the clearest and more 
nuanced psychological findings regarding terrorism’s 
emotional impact is that fear and anger seem to serve 
different psychological functions in the aftermath of a 
disaster event. One study [5] demonstrated that an 
experimental induction of fear increased participants’ 
terrorism risk perceptions, whereas inducing anger 
decreased them. In the wake of the September 11th 
terror attacks, individuals’ self-reported fear 
predicted preferences for “defensive” anti-terror 
policies (e.g., deporting suspected terrorists), while 
self-reported anger predicted support for “offensive” 
policies (e.g., aggressive military action in the 
Middle East) [6]. Fear and anger also have distinct 
behavioral and psychological correlates outside the 
domain of terrorism; perceptions of fearful and angry 
faces differentially predict approach and avoidance 
behaviors [7], and there is mounting evidence that the 
experience of fear and anger are respectively related 
to avoidance and approach motivations [8]. 
Consequently, the public’s experiences of both fear 
and anger in the wake of a terror attack likely play 
important and distinct roles in determining the 
attack’s overall effect on national discussions of 
policy. 
Of course, all expressions of fear and anger in the 
wake of terrorism are not created equal, and given 
their relevance to risk judgments and policy 
preferences, it is worth understanding how such 
emotional reactions are situated within time and 
place. Knowing how public fear and anger increase 
or decrease over time after an attack can inform 
predictions on how public discourse surrounding the 
attack will take shape, especially if one emotion 
proves to be more temporally stable than the other. 
Similarly, understanding how expressions of fear and 
anger depend on one’s distance from the attack can 
shed light on regional differences in risk perceptions. 
Such gradients of fear and anger are especially 
important to understand at the national level given 
that terror attacks are becoming increasingly local in 
nature, with a greater emphasis on small, ground-
based, “soft-target” attacks [9]. Such small-scale 
attacks may not produce the kinds of far-reaching, 
long-lasting emotional responses that characterized 
the September 11th attacks, which fueled so much of 
the seminal research on public risk perception in the 
U.S. Thus, the degree to which one’s expressions of 
fear and anger after an attack depends on their 
temporal and geographic proximity is an important 
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empirical question, and one that this study seeks to 
address. 
 
1.1 Emotion, Geography, and Time: Existing 
Research 
 
Temporal and geographic proximity to terror 
attacks have already been studied as meaningful 
predictors of public terror reactions. After the 
September 11th, 2001 attacks, posttraumatic stress, 
driving fatalities (assumed to reflect increased road 
traffic due to an aversion to flying), and estimates of 
future terrorism risk were greatest among individuals 
living close to New York City [10, 11, 12]. 
Furthermore, recent work [13] has found that social 
media expressions of fear and anger in the Paris 
metropolitan area sharply increased after a series of 
shootings in November of 2015, then sharply 
decreased in the days following. Yet it is still unclear 
how post-attack expressions of fear and anger vary 
over time and geographic proximity in a country-
wide sample; [13] limited their analyses to the Paris 
metropolitan area (a necessary characteristic of their 
method), while other studies [10, 11, 12] focused 
mainly on fear- or stress-based reactions. It is not yet 
known whether public fear and anger “behave” 
similarly or differently in the aftermath of a crisis 
when spatial distance from the event is considered, a 
finding that could help better clarify the roles that 
these emotions play in public disaster response.  
We expect that, in the aftermath of a disaster 
event (specifically, a terrorist attack for the purposes 
of this study), public expressions of both fear and 
anger will be strongest in the event’s immediate 
aftermath and decrease over time. This expectation 
aligns with previous research on emotional 
expressions in the aftermath of terror attacks [13], 
and intuitively aligns with the notion that one’s 
emotional reaction to an event becomes less severe as 
the event fades from immediate memory.  
We also expect that expressions of fear will be 
greatest at locations close to a disaster event of 
interest, as suggested by research on regional 
variations in fear following the 9/11 attacks. The 
relationship between anger and geographic distance, 
however, is more theoretically complex. Just as fear 
reactions are strongest among individuals who reside 
near where a disaster event occurred [10, 11, 12, 14], 
the same may be true of anger; the psychological 
closeness of the event may simply amplify its 
emotional intensity across all negative emotions, 
including anger. Furthermore, anger is a moral 
emotion that is often brought on by perceptions of 
suffering [15], which are likely strongest at locations 
close to a disaster event [14]. However, fear and 
anger are served by different cognitive appraisals 
[16], with fear arising from appraisals of uncertainty 
and uncontrollability, and anger arising from 
appraisals of certainty and controllability. It may be 
that individuals closer to a disaster event experience 
heightened levels of fear, but that the cognitive 
uncertainty producing such fear inhibits the 
expression of anger to the same degree as individuals 
who are distant from the attack. Thus, the unclear 
relationship between geographic distance and anger 
is one of the primary contributions of this work. 
 Lastly, we investigate whether the hypothesized 
decreases in fear and anger over time depend on an 
individual’s distance from the attack. To inform this 
research question, we again draw on [13] which 
showed that decreases in fear and anger over time 
were well-modeled by a Weibull survival model. 
This finding suggests that fear and anger did not 
decrease linearly in the sample, but that the 
magnitude of a given day’s decrease was related to 
the magnitude of emotional expression on the 
previous day. Based on this result, we expect that 
locations with the highest levels of expressed fear 
and anger will exhibit sharper decreases than 
locations with lower levels of emotional expression. 
Thus, the effect of time on fear and anger will be 
strongest at the geographic distance corresponding to 
the highest level of their expression. 
 
1.2 Present Study: Social Media Responses to 
the Orlando Nightclub Shooting 
 
To investigate gradients of fear and anger 
responses to terrorism at a national level, we focus 
our anlaysis on the 2016 shooting at the Pulse 
Nightclub in Orlando, Florida. The 2016 Orlando 
nightclub shooting was the deadliest mass shooting in 
the United States at the time of its occurrence, and is 
prototypical of the kinds of soft-target terror attacks 
that have come to dominate the terrorism landscape 
in recent years [9, 17], making it a useful case study 
on post-terror attack discourse across the United 
States. Note that we classify the Orlando shooting as 
a terror attack for the purposes of this study given 
that the shooter had personally pledged allegiance to 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria before carrying out 
the assault.   
To assess individual reactions to the attack in a 
naturalistic setting, we focus on the social media 
response following the shooting. In the aftermath of 
highly-publicized crisis events, social media can 
serve as a platform for collective information sharing 
[18, 19], partly because the desire to obtain current 
information is a strong motivation for social media 
use [19]. Social media has even been shown to serve 
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different functions for those at varying distances from 
a mass emergency, with users immediately affected 
by an event more likely to share locally-relevant 
information and those further away more likely to 
engage in generic commentary [20]. 
Of course, behavior on social media platforms is 
driven by a host of factors that can skew the quality 
of the information shared, such as users’ reputations 
[19]. Still, social media has served as a useful data 
source in other investigations of public terror 
reactions [13, 14], and it carries the benefit of 
allowing for unobtrusive measurement of individuals’ 
expressed thoughts and opinions. Thus, we argue that 
it still holds relevance for theoretically-motivated 
questions if interpreted with caution. 
 
1.3 Variables of Interest and Hypotheses 
 
Our outcome variables of interest are the use of 
fearful and angry language in Twitter posts 
discussing the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting, with 
each user’s geographic proximity to the shooting’s 
location and the elapsed time between the attack and 
authorship of their Twitter post as the primary 
predictor variables. Regarding social media 
expressions of fear in the aftermath of the attack, we 
hypothesize the following: 
1) Use of fear-related language will negatively 
correlate with the elapsed time between the 
attack and each Twitter post (i.e., decreases over 
time, as suggested by [13]). 
2) Use of fear-related language will negatively 
correlate with users’ distance from the shooting’s 
location in Orlando, FL (as suggested by 
research on regional variations in reactions to 
9/11). 
3) Distance will moderate the effect of time on fear-
related language, such that the (hypothesized) 
decrease in fear over time will be strongest at 
locations closer to the attack. 
Regarding social media expressions of anger, we 
hypothesize the following: 
1) Use of anger-related language will negatively 
correlate with the elapsed time between the 
attack and each Twitter post (i.e., decreases over 
time, as suggested by [13]). 
2) Use of anger-related language will depend on 
geographic distance from Orlando, FL, though 
we do not hypothesize the direction of this effect 
(given the potential theoretical justifications for 
both directions). 
3) Distance will moderate the effect of time on 
anger-related language, such that the 
(hypothesized) decrease in anger over time will 
be strongest at whichever distance is related to 
higher initial levels of anger. 
 
2. Method  
2.1 Sample 
 
We obtained a sample of Twitter posts made 
between June 11, 2016 and June 19, 2016 (the week 
following the Orlando nightclub shooting) that 
included one or more of the hashtags 
“#OrlandoShooting”, “#Orlando”, or 
“#pulseshooting” (an initial web search suggested 
that these were the most common hashtags used on 
social media to refer to the event). The initial dataset 
yielded over 4 million posts, from which we excluded 
all retweets (posts written by one user and re-posted 
by another) and posts that only contained hashtags or 
web address links.  
Posts had to be in English (see automatic 
language detection function in R package “cld2”; 
[21]), authored by non-verified Twitter accounts 
(where verified refers to official accounts for 
organizations or celebrities), and posted by users in 
the United States for whom location data (at the city 
level) was available. Where there were multiple posts 
written by the same user, we include only their 
earliest post, and we eliminated all posts from before 
the onset of the shooting (defined as 2:06 a.m. 
Eastern Time, June 12, 2016 [22]). Further inspection 
of the data revealed some tweets posted by news sites 
(rather than individuals) that were not screened out 
with the original criteria, which were subsequently 
removed. Filtering the dataset by these criteria 
yielded a final sample of 36,259 posts. Note that a 
sample of this size would allow us to detect bivariate 
correlations of 0.019 with 95% power, and while our 
analyses do not primarily rely on null hypothesis 
significance testing or bivariate correlations, this 
serves as an example of the sufficiency of our sample 
size for our research purposes. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
2.2.1. Text preprocessing. We implemented 
multiple cleaning steps to convert each Twitter post 
into an analyzable text object for further analysis. 
Each post was stripped of all non-punctuation/non-
alphanumeric characters (which removes special 
characters such as Emojis), as well as all links to 
other content (such as webpages or pictures). 
Because some users often use hashtags as parts of 
their post’s syntax (e.g., “Our thoughts are with the 
#pulseshooting victims”), we chose to retain all 
hashtags that were directly followed by non-hashtag 
Page 2286
words while removing all others. Thus, hashtags 
embedded in the middle of sentences are assumed to 
serve some grammatical function and are kept as part 
of the post’s content, while those that appear at the 
end (where users often place multiple hashtags in a 
row) are removed. For example, the tweet “Our 
thoughts are with the #pulseshooting victims 
#Orlando #OrlandoShooting” would be shortened to 
“Our thoughts are with the pulseshooting victims.” 
While these procedures cannot guarantee that each 
post will perfectly reflect the semantic content 
intended by the author, it reduces much of the noise 
introduced by social media conventions. 
 
2.2.2. Time and distance from attack. For each 
post, temporal distance from the Orlando attack was 
measured as the number of days (including partial 
days) between 2:06 a.m. ET on June 12, 2016 (the 
time at which police were notified of the Orlando 
shooting; [17]) and the date/time at which the post 
was created.  
Geographic proximity was measured as the 
number of miles between the latitude and longitude 
coordinates of the Pulse nightclub and the central 
latitude/longitude coordinates of each user’s nearest 
ZIP code, which was retrieved through the Bing 
Maps Application Programming Interface (API). 
Because not all users choose to report their city of 
residence in their profile (or might simply include 
broader location information, such as state or 
country), location data was only retained for users in 
the United States where the API could identify a 
single location profile at the city level. We identified 
the closest U.S. ZIP code to each city center, and 
calculated the distance between this ZIP code and the 
Pulse Nightclub using the “Imap” R package [23] and 
ZIP code location data from the United States Census 
Bureau [24]. Note that distance was measured “as the 
crow flies,” rather than based on driving distance, 
which was necessary given that some users resided in 
Hawaii. 
 
2.2.3. Covariates. One of the challenges of 
measuring the effect of geographic proximity on 
emotional expression is its confounds with other 
potentially relevant variables. Thus, we also account 
for the following covariates in our analysis: 
It is possible that individual reactions to terror 
attacks depend partly on one’s residence in an urban 
or rural area (given that many high-profile terror 
attacks target dense, urban locations), and we thus 
control for population density (given that some of the 
least densely populated areas of the United States are 
in western states and Alaska, relatively distant from 
Orlando). As aforementioned, we employed the Bing 
Maps API to match each user’s self-described 
location with a U.S. city; those that could be correctly 
matched were cross-referenced with data from the 
2010 Census [25] to produce city-level population 
density for each user. 
Note that we conduct all analysis with the 
logarithm of population density; this transformation 
reduced substantial positive skewness, and reflects 
the theoretical assumption that differences in 
population density on the lower end (distinguishing 
urban from rural areas) likely matter more than 
similar-sized variations at the high end 
(distinguishing urban areas of different density). As 
an example, using raw population densities for 
Galena, AK (a small town with population 5,700), 
Dallas, TX, and New York, NY leads to a difference 
in “urban-ness” between Dallas and New York (both 
major cities) that is roughly 7.5 times the difference 
in “urban-ness” between Dallas and Galena (one of 
which is considered a large city, the other a small 
town). Meanwhile, employing log-scaled population 
density sets these differences as approximately equal, 
which seemed to better represent the distinction 
between urban and rural areas. 
Many of the lowest-earning states in the U.S. are 
in or near the American South, according to recent 
census data (e.g., Mississippi, West Virginia, 
Arkansas, Alabama, Kentucky), whereas some of the 
highest earning states are in the northeast (New 
Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire) 
or even outside the continental U.S. (Alaska, 
Hawaii). To ensure that any effect of geographic 
distance was unrelated to any regional disparities in 
wealth, we estimated users’ income based on the 
Twitter accounts they followed. This method comes 
from [26], which identified the Twitter accounts that 
best predicted the annual income of the users that 
followed them. We apply the regression model from 
their study to each of our user’s friends list to 
estimate which of four income categories ($0-
$50,000; $50,000-$100,000; $100,000-$150,000; 
$150,000+) the user most likely belongs to, and 
defined their estimated income as the lower bound of 
their most likely income bracket. See [26] for a list of 
the Twitter accounts used to estimate income, along 
with their respective regression weights. Users’ 
scores for each income bracket were calculated as the 
sum of the weights for the accounts they followed 
that corresponded to that income bracket, and they 
were assigned to the income bracket for which they 
had the highest score.  
Lastly, we sought to ensure that any effects of 
geographic distance were not confounded with any 
regional differences in political orientation. While 
political orientation is not directly available from 
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Twitter profiles, we employ a method introduced by 
[27] to estimate the political sentiments of each user. 
In this procedure, [27] estimated the average political 
ideology of the users who followed various Twitter 
news accounts (e.g., @foxnews, @latimes), based on 
the Congress members that their audiences also 
followed. We use these ideology estimates for 20 
news accounts to estimate each participants’ political 
orientation as the average ideology score of the news 
accounts they follow; see [27] for a list of the news 
accounts used for this calculation.  
 
2.2.4. Anger- and fear-related language. Anger and 
fear expressions in each post were defined as the 
number of words from the anxiety and anger 
dictionaries from Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
[28], a widely-used and well-validated collections of 
terms representing psychological constructs that has 
previously been used in social media analyses of 
public terrorism response [13]. The anxiety 
dictionary contains terms such as scared, vulnerable, 
stunned, and uneasy, while the anger dictionary 
contains terms such as angry, evil, mad, and hate. We 
specifically removed the term terror* from the 
anxiety dictionary (as users who referenced terrorism 
may not necessarily be expressing fear), and removed 
the terms kill and victim from the anger dictionary, as 
users employing these terms may have simply been 
describing the attack. 
 
2.3 Analysis 
 
We rely on Bayesian Poisson regression to test for 
relationships between each of our psychological 
distance predictors and our word-count variables of 
interest (fear expressions, anger expressions, and 
concrete term use), and communicate all regression 
effects using 95% Highest Posterior Density (HPD) 
intervals (i.e., the shortest interval containing 95% of 
the parameter’s posterior density). Poisson regression 
is a method for analyzing count data when the 
variance is approximately equal to the mean, which 
was true for word counts of fear ( =0.068, s2=0.072) 
and anger ( =0.388, s2=0.401), and both word count 
variables were well-approximated by Poisson 
distributions. Note that, because we use raw word 
counts rather than term frequencies (i.e., raw word 
counts divided by the text’s length), we include 
Tweet word count as a covariate in all analyses, such 
that all reported effects are independent of the length 
of each Twitter post. 
Given that estimating users’ income and political 
orientation required that they follow certain accounts 
(and also required that their list of followed accounts 
was made publicly available), only n=16,492 users 
had non-missing estimates for political orientation 
and income. Thus, in all models, we first test for the 
effect of temporal and geographic distance on each 
user’s fear and anger term counts, then confirm that 
such effects remain reliable when including 
population density (in the full sample) and income 
and political orientation (in the n=16,492 subsample 
of users with non-missing data). Note that fear and 
anger term counts did not appreciably differ between 
the subsamples of users with and without missing 
political orientation and income estimates 
( <0.05). 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure 1 presents kernel density plots for each 
predictor, and shows how most variables exhibited at 
least some degree of skew, with some bimodality 
present in the population density variable (largely due 
to the high calculated population density of New 
York City, which comprises the righthand mode of 
the distribution). As aforementioned, we conduct all 
analyses using the logarithm of population density 
rather than its raw value (also presented in Figure 1).  
Time and geographic proximity were virtually 
uncorrelated with each other (Spearman’s ρ=-0.019), 
as was geographic proximity with income estimates 
(ρ=-0.059) and political orientation (ρ=-0.050). 
Distance and population density were correlated at 
ρ=0.262, suggesting that users who lived further from 
Orlando tended to occupy more densely populated 
areas. Lastly, counts of fear- and anger-related terms 
were relatively uncorrelated (ρ=0.025). 
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 Figure 1. Density plots for predictors and 
covariates 
 
3.2 Predicting Expressions of Fear 
 
Expressions of fear on Twitter decreased as a 
function of time since the attack (eb=0.816, 95% 
HPD=0.770, 0.862); interpreting the exponentiated 
regression coefficient suggests that each passing day 
corresponded to an 18.4% decrease in the prevalence 
of fear-related terms. There was no reliable main 
effect of geographic distance (eb=0.969, 95% 
HPD=0.892, 1.053), though time and distance did 
interact in predicting fear-related language (eb=1.061, 
95% HPD=1.021, 1.102), with the effect of time on 
fear-related term use decreasing as distance from the 
attack increased. Each passing day corresponded to 
an 18.4% decrease in term use at 0 miles from the 
attack, a 13.4% decrease at 1000 miles from the 
attack, an 8.2% decrease at 200 miles from the attack, 
and a 2.6% decrease at 3000 miles from the attack. 
Note that the magnitudes of these effects were 
unchanged when including population density in the 
model ( =0.815; =0.962; =1.061). 
Effect sizes changed slightly when including income 
and political orientation (for the n=16,492 subset 
with non-missing values; =0.846; =0.979; 
=1.050), though were comparable to the effects 
estimated in the n=16,492 subset without covariates 
included ( =0.842; =0.977; =1.051), 
suggesting that the inclusion of income, political 
orientation, and population density did not attenuate 
the effects of time and proximity on expressions of 
fear. While not relevant to our hypotheses, note that 
political orientation (but not income) was reliably 
predictive of fear-related language (eb=1.010, 95% 
HPD=1.001, 1.018), with a one SD change towards 
more liberal political orientation predicting a 7.5% 
increase in fear-related term use. 
Figure 2 shows the gradient of predicted fear term 
use at different values of time and geographic 
distance. Note that the effect of time is strongly 
negative at close distances, but attenuates towards 
zero at more distant locations. Interestingly, the effect 
of distance is almost nonexistent at the time of the 
attack’s occurrence, but becomes increasingly 
positive (with greater geographic distance predicting 
more expressions of fear) as time passes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Gradient for predicted fear terms 
 
3.3 Predicting Expressions of Anger 
 
Anger-related terms also reliably decreased over 
time (eb=0.961, HPD=0.942, 0.979), though to a 
lesser degree than fear-related language, with the 
average number of anger terms decreasing by 3.9% 
with each passing day. Unlike with fear, the main 
effect of distance was reliable (eb=1.061, 
HPD=1.025, 1.095) and suggested that the average 
number of anger-related words increased by 6.1% for 
each 1000 miles of distance from Orlando. However, 
the use of anger-related language did not depend on 
an interaction between time and geographic distance 
(eb=1.005, HPD=0.991, 1.019). These effects did not 
appreciably change when including population 
density ( =0.961; =1.059; =1.004) or 
income and population density (n=16,492 subsample; 
=0.965; =1.045; =1.005). Note that 
estimates of political orientation (but not income) 
were slightly predictive of anger-related language 
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(eb=0.992, 95% HPD=0.989, 0.996), with a one SD 
change towards more liberal political orientation 
predicting a 5.4% decrease in anger-related term use. 
Figure 3 shows the gradient of predicted anger-
related term use at various times and distances from 
the attack. Note that the gradient is generally flatter 
than that of fear, largely reflecting the smaller role of 
time in predicting anger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Gradient for predicted anger terms 
 
3.4 Base Rates of Fear and Anger 
 
To better contextualize the degrees of fear and 
anger expressed in each user’s post, we collected up 
to 200 of each user’s most recent posts made before 
the Orlando shooting, data which was publicly 
available for n=21,811 users, and identified the 
average number of fear- and anger-related terms that 
appeared in each post prior to the Orlando attack 
(note that this subsample did not severely differ from 
the other users in terms of fear or anger expressions 
in their posts; <0.05). On average, we collected 
163 posts per user, which contained an average of 
0.027 fear-related words per post (compared to 0.068 
across the Orlando-focused tweets) and 0.060 anger-
related words per post (compared to 0.388 across the 
Orlando-focused tweets). 
Taking these values as base rate estimates of fear 
and anger term usage suggests that expressions of 
fear and anger were understandably more prevalent in 
our sample of Tweets than would be expected during 
“normal” Twitter activity by the same group of users, 
with the pre/post-attack change in anger language (a 
547% increase) more pronounced than for fear (a 
153% increase). Furthermore, examining these base 
rates in relation to the prediction gradients in Figures 
2 and 3 suggests that anger-related language 
remained heightened through the week for users at all 
locations. Fear-related language remained heightened 
only for users distant from Orlando; those who lived 
near Orlando were predicted to return to pre-attack 
levels of fear language by roughly the fifth day after 
the attack. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The data partially supported our hypotheses 
regarding the effects of time and geographic distance 
on social media sentiment following the Orlando 
nightclub shooting. As hypothesized, both anger-
related and fear-related language in Tweets 
discussing the attack decreased over time, though 
expressions of fear decayed much more quickly than 
expressions of anger. As hypothesized, time and 
distance interacted in the model predicting fear (but 
not anger), suggesting that the time decay of fear-
related language was most pronounced at locations 
closest to the Orlando shooting; however, this 
interaction seemed to increase, rather than decrease, 
the magnitude of the distance-fear association over 
time, given distance’s null effect in the attack’s 
immediate aftermath. Regional differences in anger 
were not as pronounced, but our model suggested that 
anger-related language was most common at distant, 
rather than proximal, locations (though distance and 
time did not interact in their effects on anger 
expressions, as hypothesized). Note that all estimated 
effects controlled for any potential influence of 
population density, estimated political orientation, 
and estimated user income. 
Taken together, these results confirm past findings 
on the decline in negative sentiment in the days 
following terror attacks [13], while also suggesting 
potentially important differences in the public’s 
experience of the two emotions. Future studies 
should attempt to replicate our finding that linguistic 
markers of anger were more temporally stable than 
fear (and were less likely to return to pre-attack 
levels), as any real difference in the public’s tendency 
to “hold on” to one emotion over the other could 
have important implications for public discourse 
about terrorism. In general, spatial variation in both 
emotions suggests that users far from the attack 
remained relatively fearful and angry about the attack 
in the week following it, whereas users closer to the 
attack seemed to remain angry while reducing their 
expressions of fear to pre-attack levels relatively 
quickly. One possible explanation is that anger was 
related to users’ frustrations about societal or policy 
issues (e.g., recurrence of mass shootings, feelings 
towards terrorism, gun control laws, etc.) and was 
thus relatively stable across time and space. Yet as 
time passed, users close to the attack may have 
transitioned from expressing fear to expressing other 
emotions such as sympathy or solidarity (which have 
been shown to increase with geographic proximity to 
an event [13]), while distant users may have felt these 
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emotions to a lesser degree and remained generally 
fearful about the prospect of a future attack.  
Perhaps one of the most applicable conclusions to 
be drawn here is the value of studying public anger 
following a highly publicized act of terror. Many 
studies on public terror reactions focus primarily on 
fear [29, 30, 31] or fear-related constructs, such as 
perceptions of risk. Yet while a handful of studies 
have acknowledged the diverging effects of fear and 
anger on relevant constructs such as policy attitudes, 
anger is still far from the focus of attention as a 
dependent measure in terrorism research. Our results 
suggest that anger, compared to fear, 1) increased 
more sharply in response to the Orlando shooting, 2) 
remained at elevated levels for longer, and 3) 
exhibited fewer regional variations (whereas fear 
decayed at different rates at different distances from 
Orlando), suggesting its potential usefulness as a 
central variable of interest in research on the public’s 
response to terror. Furthermore, given that emotions 
can exhibit a contagion effect on social media [32, 
33], the relative temporal and geographic stability of 
anger may suggest a particularly strong ability for it 
to propagate through social networks (compared to 
fear, which exhibited more regional variation and 
diminished more quickly over time), though this 
assertion should be tested in future research. If this is 
truly the case, then specifically monitoring angry 
social media posts in an event’s aftermath can help 
officials better predict which sentiments and ideas 
may propagate to others and remain in circulation the 
longest.   
There are, of course, many limitations of any 
psychological investigation involving social media. 
Participants were inherently selected by outcome, 
since they were only included if they had a Twitter 
account and specifically chose to respond to the 
Orlando attack. Many potential covariates of interest 
(e.g., gender and other demographic characteristics) 
were unable to be studied due to the difficult nature 
of ascertaining individual-level data from social 
media. Thus, our inclusion of income, population 
density, and political orientation merely represents an 
attempt to estimate variables that might have been 
correlated with physical distance, rather than an 
exhaustive set of relevant individual difference 
variables. Another limitation of text-analytic studies 
is small effect sizes, given the noise inherent to 
studies of natural language, and it is important to 
emphasize that such effects are much more valuable 
from a theory-building standpoint than a predictive 
standpoint. As aforementioned, sentiment expressed 
on social media should not necessarily be taken as an 
unbiased measure of an individual’s true emotional 
experience, given the many motivations that can 
drive individual social media behavior (desire to 
impress followers, conformity to the behavior of 
one’s social network, etc.). Furthermore, we selected 
an event that victimized a specific minority 
community (LGBTQ+), and levels of fear and anger 
may have been affected by this unique characteristic 
of the attack (e.g., more emotional intensity from 
users that identify with the LGBTQ+ community).  
Still, this data’s value lies in its ability to convey 
contemporaneous reactions to a highly publicized 
terror attack across a wide geographic area, while 
allowing us to compare individuals’ emotional 
expressions to baseline activity and control for 
potential confounds (income, urban vs. rural 
residence, political orientation). Furthermore, as 
other researchers have pointed out [34], social media 
studies are valuable in their ability to generate data-
driven hypotheses for future study in more controlled 
settings. Our results have suggested that anger may 
be a more predictable and stable emotional response 
to terror attacks than fear, a contrast that this study’s 
focus on temporal and geographic distance is in a 
unique position to draw.  
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